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Editors’ Comments
Special Issue Editorial: Platform
Competition in the Digital Era—
Overview and Research Directions

Introduction
In this editorial, we provide a framing for the
articles published in the two special issues on
“Strategies for Surviving and Thriving Within
and Between Digital Platforms” (MISQE Volume
20, Issue 4, and MISQE Volume 21, lssue 1). Our
audience is academics interested in the nascent
field of platform competition. For this audience,
we synthesize and contextualize the eight articles
in the special issue. We also provide a systematic
framing designed to stimulate academic interest
and practice-oriented research that can benefit
current and future information systems leaders.
We show how platform competition relates to
and expands upon classical views of competition.
We also explain why, given the exponentially
expanding digitalization of business activities,
platform competition has recently become a
salient topic in scholarly analyses of strategy and
industrial competition. The eight articles in the
special issue offer a rich and diverse perspective
on the various facets of platform competition, but
a common theme in all of them is that they focus
on digitalization effects, on firm-level competition
and on consequent new (material) arrangements
that shape and characterize competition.
This editorial is organized as follows. We
start with a short summary and review of
the definitions of platforms and digitizing.
We show how digitizing shapes the emerging
field of platform competition by creating new
types of reach and range effects that promote
platform creation and evolution. We also
introduce a framework to analyze four “fronts of
competition”: intra-, inter-, per-1 and pre-platform
competition. We note that each front introduces
different goals, concerns and dynamics that need
to be considered by managers. We also note that
platform competition in the emerging landscape
can occur within, between and across platforms
and at several layers of the digital service stack.
1

Per in Latin means across or between.

Thus, the competitive landscape for each firm can
be formed by selecting one of multiple feasible
permutations of the competitive fronts and their
competitive dynamics. We synthesize the eight
articles in this special issue by organizing their
contributions within the proposed platform
competition framework. This allows us to tease
out common themes by identifying the general
competitive tensions created by reach and range
effects associated with platform competition.
To conclude, we argue that these tensions are
contingent on the platform type and context and
that their constant resolution determines firms’
emergent competitive strategies.

Platforms, Digitalization and
Competition
Platforms
Generally, platforms are sociotechnical
arrangement-enabling interactions between
participants. They provide additional value to
participants that is not attainable without the
platform.2 The etymology of the term platform
originates from two Latin words: Plat, meaning
flat or level, and forme, meaning the shape or
arrangement of parts. Together they connote
a flat, possibly raised, “surface” onto which
something can be placed. Conceptually, the plat
(physical part) implies the presence of a pool
of resources on which interactions can take
place, and the social part includes a set of rules,
expectations, norms and goals that undergird,
organize and govern participants’ interactions
and the benefits attained. This broad definition
covers a wide range of interactions, such as those
happening in or with medieval marketplaces, gay
bars, credit cards, stock exchanges, or on digital
platforms such as Wintel, Android, app stores,
Uber, AirBnB and Kickstarter.
A special case, and our focus, are platforms
that enable interactions associated with economic
exchanges.3 In such settings, the platform can
2 Hagiu, A. and Wright, J. “Multi-Sided Platforms,” International
Journal of Industrial Organization (43), 2015, 162–174.
3 Beyond our scope are platforms (e.g., social media platforms),
where nations and political movements compete for influence and/or
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be defined as “an intermediary, with which
market sides affiliate directly, enabling direct
interactions between the sides to exchange
platform goods.”4
Platforms as sociotechnical arrangements
differ from vertical integration and the resulting
hierarchical forms of controlling participants’
behaviors5 (visible hand). With the latter,
participant interactions can be wider in scope
and intensity but the interactions are not
autonomous. One party will release the right
to control their behaviors to another party.
Platforms, however, always manifest forms of
market-based control,6,7where each participant’s
interactions are, in principle, voluntary and
autonomous (invisible hand).
The notion of a platform as a form of
economic exchange has a long history. The
early forms were medieval marketplaces, free
towns and, later, stock exchanges. These were
then followed by credit cards and malls, for
example. The term gained currency in the 1990s
in the operations management and product
development literatures. These research streams
introduced the concept of the platform product,
which “meets the needs of a core group of
customers but [is designed] for easy modification
into
derivatives
through
the
addition,
substitution, or removal of features.”8 Platform
products are generally viewed as firms’ internal
platforms, enabling interactions between a wider
range of (external) participants (also called
complementors) involved in and contributing
to product design and use and increasing the
value to end consumers. Product platforms can
be defined as “a set of subsystems and interfaces
that form a common structure from which a
dominance, as witnessed during the recent invasion of Ukraine.
4 Karhu K., Heiskala, M. and Ritala, P. T. “Beyond the N in Network Effects: A Unified Platform Market Model with Five Network
Externality Types,” 2021, Unpublished Working Paper.
5 Chandler, A., Jr. The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution
in American business, 1977, Belknap. Press of Harvard University
Press.
6 Malone, T., Yates, J. and Benjamin, R. “Electronic Markets and
Electronic Hierarchies,”Communications of the ACM, (30:6), 1987,
pp. 484-497.
7 There are some blurred forms of platforms between pure markets
and pure hierarchies such as IoT platforms in our case. Such forms
are created for economic benefits for participants but they do not
exhibit just competition but forms of coopetition which is also
increasingly common as platforms have become more common.
8 Wheelwright, S. C. and Clark, K. B. “Creating Project Plans to
Focus Product Development,” Harvard Business Review (70), 1992,
pp. 67-83.
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stream of derivative products can be efficiently
developed and produced.”9 As such product
platforms promote novel interactions between
platform participants and increase the variability
and product value to participants. Such product
platforms are common in cars (e.g., Volkswagen/
Audi; Toyota), computer electronics and software
(WINTEL). They enable faster product variation
and a combination of scale and scope economies
during product design and manufacturing.10
These product and exchange platforms
surged in the 1990s because of a growing
interest in platform investments, platform
technologies (enabling “platformization” i.e.,
how to turn products into “meeting places”
for novel participant interactions and forms of
deriving value) and platform thinking. These
new logics have deeply permeated innovation
management and strategy research since then,
resulting in a myriad of models showing how
firms can effectively position and compete
with their products by implementing design
rules that guide platform designs (such as
modularization).11 This research has also
produced typologies of the ways in which
participant interactions can be organized across
subsystems of industrial organization, including
1) internal, 2) supply chain and 3) industry
platforms.12

Digital Platforms
Platforms as a means of interaction and value
exchange have proliferated over the last 30 years.
In a relatively short period, they have become a
dominant form of value creation and extraction
in many industries.13 Their recent prominence
is largely due to extensive digitizing of analogic
forms of representations involved in product or
platform interactions (e.g., invoices, transactions,
9 Meyer, M. H. and Lehnerd, A. P. The Power of Product Platforms: Building Value and Cost leadership, 1997, The Free Press.
10 Gawer, A. “Bridging Differing Perspectives on Technological
Platforms: Toward an Integrative Framework,” Research Policy
(43:7), 2014, pp. 1239-1249.
11 Baldwin, C. Y. and Woodard, C. J. “The Architecture of Platforms: A Unified View,” in Platforms, Markets and Innovation, A.
Gawer (Ed.), Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009, pp. 19-44
12 Gawer, A. “Platform Dynamics and Strategies: From Products
to Services,” in Platforms, Markets, and Innovation, A. Gawer,
(Ed.), Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009, pp. 45-76.
13 Parker, G. G., Van Alstyne, M. W. and Choudary, S. P. Platform Revolution: How Networked Markets Are Transforming the
Economy and How to Make Them Work for You, 2016, Norton.
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equities, blueprints, tire pressures, locations,
personal information, exchange properties etc.).
Continued digitizing has enabled faster, cheaper,
more extensive and more diverse interactions
between product/service users, between users
and producers, and between those participating
in product exchange or use. This has resulted
in novel forms of digitalization, which now
manifest as novel platform types or expanding
and transformed existing platforms. This also
explains the rapid growth and success of a new
breed of platforms and platform arrangements—
for example, Google, Amazon, Facebook, ITunes,
Spotify, Uber and AirBnB.14 Digital platforms
now represent the dominant sociotechnical
arrangement, governing most production and
exchange activities associated with products and
services in industrial organizations. Given the
scope and extent of digitizing, most participant
interactions on platforms are currently mediated
by digital representations.
Generally, the constant platformization of
the industrial economy can be attributed to the
effect of several unique features that characterize
digital objects (i.e., the results of digitizing), how
their use is organized and the effects this has
on social settings (digitalization). These novel
features create unprecedented scale and scope
benefits that accrue from the loosely coupled
product architectures of digital products and
their bitstring interfaces. These features enable
continued combinatorial innovation, easy
repurposing and generativity,15,16 which radically
expand the variety and volume of participants
on (product) platforms (reach effects) and widen
the novelty and range of interactions between
participants (range effects). Digital platforms
make interactions independent of place, time or
other constraints, and enable these interactions
to take place across multiple resource pools (i.e.,
varying networks and devices) (reach effects).
Digitizing and digitalization have amplified both
reach and range effects, which has led to the
14 Tilson, D., Lyytinen, K., & Sørensen, C. “Digital Infrastructures: The Missing IS Research Agenda,” Information Systems
Research (21:4), 2010, pp. 748-758. This is famously expressed in
Andressen’s statement “Why Software Is Eating the World”
15 Lyytinen, K. “Innovation Logics in the Digital Era: A Systemic
Review of the Emerging Digital Innovation Regime,” Innovation:
Organization and Management, forthcoming.
16 Piccoli, G., Rodriguez, J., Grover, V. “Strategic Initiatives and
Digital Resources: Construct Definition and Future Research Directions,” MIS Quarterly, forthcoming

radical rearrangement and deep transformation
of existing platforms (such as stock exchanges or
credit cards) and created new types of platforms
that have disrupted entire industries (e.g.,
Amazon, AirBnB) and created new ones (e.g., art
NFTs). The key drivers of such digitalization and
platformization are:
(1) Automation and efficiency effects. For
example, in the 20 years between 1990-2010,
the trading costs in the NYSE and NASDAQ went
from ca. $20.00 per transaction to $0.001, while
the time needed to execute trades went form
30 minutes to 4-5 nanoseconds (billionths of a
second).
(2) Reach effects. The number of
participants trading in the NYSE and NASDAQ
has gone from a few thousand privileged traders
and market makers to millions of retail investors
(distributed across the globe, in principle). With
the expansion of the futures markets during
traditional nontrading hours, trading has become
a 24/7 operation.
(3) Range effects. New trading services
and products have emerged in multiple trading
platforms, from initial index-based equities to
variants of futures and complex derivatives, with
new additional services and forms of trading
such as high-frequency trading (HFT).
(4) Information effects. The transparency
of the state and scope of interactions in stock
exchanges have increased. Earlier market
positions were primarily visible only to market
makers while they are now, in principle, open to
anyone willing to bear the cost. This has resulted
in the reduction of market maker spreads from
25-30 to 0.1 cents, for example.17
These effects naturally vary from one platform
to another, but most platforms represent
all such effects in one form or another. The
most important effects from the viewpoint of
understanding the emerging field of platform
competition are reach effects (the increase in
the number and variety of participants and the
volume, scale and frequency of interactions)
and range effects (the increase in the variety
and diversity of interactions and related value
propositions). Reach effects result in positive
network effects, while range effects allow for
17 MacKenzie D. Trading at the Speed of Light: How Ultrafast
Algorithms Are Transforming Financial Market, 2021, Princeton
University Press.
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the creation of while range effects allow for
the creation of new value and network effects
new value and network effects.18 Together,
these effects provide constant improvements
in the localization and performance of platform
interactions within novel settings implicating
additional participants. Examples include the use
of mobile phones, the introduction of intelligent
agents (e.g., Echo, Alexa) and the recent rush to
autonomous vehicles.
Correspondingly, the organization of the
layered modular architecture of digital platforms
offers the capability to expand the network
reach of the software services by embedding
platforms into other settings (multihoming).19
The range effects directly result from the layered
modular architecture whenever the content and
services can be flexibly bundled, unleashing the
combinatorial innovation potential of software
modularity and repurposing capabilities and
resulting in generativity (i.e., the constant reinnovation of technology by new audiences).20
A visible outcome of such effects is that most
physical products now come with digital folds
and, as a result, the digital features and services
of most physical products can be constantly
expanded, resulting in platformization.21

Platform Competition
As
new
platforms
and
competitive
environments have emerged, the conditions,
principles and rules of competition have radically
changed.22 In most industries, organizations face
a new kind of competitive reality, as illustrated
by the recent rapid fall of many iconic firms, such
as J.C. Penney, Neiman Marcus, Brooks Brothers,
or Sears to name a few in the United States. All
of these companies were early stalwarts of a
successful industrial business logic.
Competition can be defined as the rivalry
between two or more parties striving for a
common goal that cannot be fully shared.
18 Karhu. K, Heiskala, M. and Ritala, P. T., op cit., 2021.
19 Yoo, Y., Henfridsson, O., & Lyytinen, K. “Research Commentary—The New Organizing Logic of Digital Innovation: An Agenda
for Information Systems Research,” Information Systems Research
(21:4), 2010, pp. 724-735.
20 Tilson, D., Lyytinen, K. and Sørensen, C. op. cit., 2010.
21 For an example see Sandberg J., Holmström J. and Lyytinen, K.
“Digitization and Phase Transitions in Platform Organizing Logics:
Evidence from the Process Automation Industry,” MIS Quarterly
(44:1), 2020, pp. 129-153.
22 Parker, G. G., Van Alstyne, M. W. and Choudary, S. P., op. cit,
2016.
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However, in platform competition, participants
operate within and/or across platforms. Rivalry
thus includes elements of cooperation, and the
arena for competition itself will keep changing
as the boundaries of markets are constantly
changed and blurred. Ultimately, the focus is on
the conditions and means necessary for firms
to survive and thrive in the new competitive
landscape, which is shaped by platform
competition. The main area of potential research
impact thus revolves around the new conditions,
rules and dynamics of rivalry engendered by the
emergence of platforms in growing numbers
within a variety of industries. These firms may
be incumbents transitioning from a traditional
value chain model to a platform design, or new
“born digital” agile ventures seeking to disrupt
an industry or marketplace. Such conditions
are defined primarily by the type, extent and
value of the interactions enabled by the involved
platforms, their scarcity conditions (expressed
mostly in positive network effects), and the
mechanisms through which value is created,
extracted and shared on the platform between
involved participants. Therefore, analyses
of platform competition primarily focus on
how to create, balance, and sustain reach and
range effects (that enable positive network
externalities) while continuing to add value to a
diverse set of participants.23
It is useful to contrast platform competition
with traditional and familiar forms of
competition that dominated the era of industrial
organization and its strategy concepts.
During this era, competition conditions were
defined by strictly circumscribed markets and
related conditions for access, market visibility
(advertising/branding) and rules of exchange
(such as consumer regulation/antitrust laws).24
The conditions defined vertical industries and
associated rules of competition according to
standard industrial classification (SIC) codes,
for example. In addition, the competition was
shaped by geographical jurisdictions and
regulatory regimes (customs, taxes, logistics
etc.). Many of the rules and principles that
govern such competition have been expressed
in popular models of competition taught
23 Karhu, K., Heiskala, M., Ritala, P. T., op cit., 2021.
24 An excellent and detailed description of how such markets and
competition were formed in the U.S. can be found in Chandler, A.,
Jr., op. cit., 1977.
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in marketing (e.g., product, price, place,
promotion),25 or strategy (e.g., cost leadership,
differentiation,
segmentation).26
Generally,
in these models, competitive advantage is
determined by the firm’s relative advantage in
economies of scale and scope—i.e., efficiency
and effectiveness differences that accrue from
larger production scales, better products, better
branding and positioning.
As demonstrated by the rise of platforms and
the corresponding demise of companies that
followed industrial-era competition recipes,
platformization within and across industries
has been disruptive. It has created unseen and
novel conditions that characterize contemporary
intra- and interplatform competition, which
was a relatively uncommon phenomenon
until recently.27,28 In addition, new forms of
competition continue to emerge at a rapid pace
as digitizing and subsequent digitalization
arrangements take root across industries. Many
of these emerging forms of competition remain
poorly understood. They emerge organically
from extensive experimentation and learningby-doing fueled by technological advances,
ample access to venture capital and intense
innovation. Indeed, one goal of this special issue
is to shed light on the new emergent forms of
platform competition by reporting a diverse
set of detailed case studies describing unique
industry, technological and geographical settings
where (digital) platforms are approached as a
new element of the firm’s competitive landscape.
Below, we advance a definition and describe the
organization and emerging architecture that
governs platform competition.

Framing Platform Competition
We define platform competition as a type of
rivalry where two or more organizations strive
to fulfill their (partially) nonshareable goals by
participating in platform interactions and where
such interactions will reduce the value gained
directly or indirectly by other parties from such

25 Kotler, P. Marketing Management: Analysis, Planning and
Control, 1967, Prentice-Hall.
26 Porter, M. E. Competitive Strategy, 1980, Free Press.
27 See, e.g., Parker, G. G., Van Alstyne, M. W. and Choudary, S.
P., op. cit., 2016.
28 Cennamo C., Diaferia L., Gaur A. and Salviotti, G. “Platform
Disruption: How Digital Platforms Re-Architect Existing Markets,”
2022, current issue.

interactions.29 As noted above, at some stage
or setting these interactions involve exchanges
of “market goods.” These can be information,
service, physical products or other intangible
benefits. The properties of these exchanges
and ways of creating value from them are far
more complex than those found in traditional
exchanges within markets (and related
platforms). The complexity is largely due to the
digitizing of some or all elements of the involved
exchanges (See Figure 1) and the presence of
layered modular product architecture in enabling
such exchanges. The following typology maps
key competitive fronts that characterize digital
platform competition:
(1) Intraplatform competition. Competition
arises in two-sided or multisided exchanges
where demand- and supply-side participants
interact on the platform as dictated by the
rules, resources and forms sanctioned by
the platform owner. The owner controls and
operates the platform and, in return, captures
value from the participant’s (complementor’s)
interactions directly (e.g., by selling a digital
service) or indirectly (e.g., by taking a financial
cut of products sold by participants). One
complicating factor in multisided exchanges is
that participants often operate simultaneously
in multiple roles (as both demand- and supplyside users or as owner/supply-side users),
creating unique tensions for platform operation
and evolution.30 We define such competition
as intraplatform competition because it
encompasses rivalries between heterogeneous
platform participants (participants/owners).
(2) Interplatform competition. Competition
ensues in specific activity domains where the
exchanges take place and create competition
between partially overlapping platforms that
seek to enable similar interactions between
heterogeneous pools of participants (e.g., Apple
iTunes vs. Spotify vs. GooglePlay), or between
different, overlapping domains and markets
(e.g., Mobilepay vs. credit cards vs. Apple Pay).
We define such competition interplatform
competition in that it encompasses rivalries

29 In platform competition there are also new opportunities to
expand reach and range through cooperation on sharable goals.
30 See for example Wareham, J., Fox, P. B., Giner, J. L. C. “Technology ecosystem governance.” Organizational Science (25:4),
2014, pp. 1195-1121.
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between platforms within and across multiple
partially overlapping competitive arenas.
(3) Per-platform competition. Competition
emerges across platforms when a specific
firm competes with its products and services
in a new competitive landscape. This means
that firms either have to establish their “own”
platform for a specific market/domain or
reach out and participate on other platforms
to promote its services/products or carry out
exchanges on those platforms. This effort needs
to be integrated with the traditional forms of
competition for many incumbents. This form,
in terms of extent and volume, is probably the
most common form of competition that most
firms experience in the contemporary economy.
We define such competition as per-platform
competition because it encompasses rivalries
that a firm engages in across platforms while
competing in its business ecosystem.
(4) Pre-platform competition. Competition
emerges between platform owners and
participants of various innovation communities
that invent and/or implement new platform
features that are likely to improve the reach
or range effects of the focal platform. This
competition focuses on the forms of control
and sharing of invented digital resources
(e.g., through open source development)
and how associated intellectual property is
(non)monetized as part of the competitive
platform strategy. This precompetitive activity
materializes and improves the platform’s scaling
and flexibility (reach and range effects) and/
or removes control points for value extraction
by (other) platform owners or complementors
within the business ecosystem. We define such
competition as pre-platform competition because
it encompasses technology-focused rivalries in
which a firm engages while innovating around
its service stack and seeking to monetize, protect
and/or share its digital assets and related
intellectual property rights.
Generally, as can be inferred from our
definition and description, platform competition
forms a highly complex system. Traditionally,
pipeline companies were process oriented
toward a single competitive market (for each
SBU) and sought to improve the quantity
and quality of their value-adding activities to
increase the scale and scope effects within that
market. In contrast, for platform competition,
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companies need to become network oriented,
constantly improving the quality and quantity
of their interactions on and across the platforms
to generate value for involved participants. At
the same time, they need to capture enough
value to prosper and survive. In a pipeline
company, a firm’s competitive position and
dynamics primarily concern the management of
the pipeline by coordinating the gaps between
supply and demand. In a platform company,
competition emerges as a dynamic process
of ecosystem orchestration, where a firm
seeks to find a “feasible” niche in its evolving
business ecosystem. The orchestration tries to
position the firm into a dominant location in
the ecosystem by expanding its control over
other ecosystem participants. This happens
by fostering and controlling a complex set of
dependencies within the ecosystem.
In this new competitive landscape, the
firm’s attention needs to move outward
toward multiple arenas and potential platform
interactions across the full ecosystem. The
value creation and extraction take place
simultaneously
on
multiple
competitive
fronts.31,32 The firm needs to address reach vs.
range trade-offs in its intra- and interplatform
competition and balance the pace of competition
and its focus across several competitive fronts.
The firm needs to also address stability vs.
evolvability trade-offs that emerge on its
precompetitive front. Generally, depending
on the firm’s location within its business
ecosystem, the firm needs to decide where
and how to compete in multiple arenas.
Typical compositions of platform competition
involve platform owners engaging in cycles of
synchronized intra-, inter- and pre-platform
competition. For firms offering complements,
they need to compete through cycles of
intraplatform and per-platform competition
(e.g., multihoming). Traditional incumbent firms
in established industries face a new variety of
competitive cycles as they venture into platform
competition. This could involve participating on
31 See, e.g., Staykova, K. and Damsgaard, J. “How Digital Platforms Compete Against Diverse Rivals,” MIS Quarterly Executive
(21:4), 2021, pp 275-295.
32 Rövekamp, P., Ollig, P., Buhl, H. U., Keller, R., Christmann,
R., Remmert, P. and Thamm, T. “How Dr. Oetker’s Digital Platform
Strategy Evolved to Include Cross-Platform Orchestration,” 2022,
current issue.
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Figure 1: Framework for Platform Competition

other platforms (intraplatform and per-platform
competition) and potentially engaging in new
forms of pre-platform competition. Because
of this heightened complexity, firms need to
balance and coordinate their competitive moves
across several competitive fronts. They must
constantly be ready to pivot as they face new
tussles and new confrontations in their business
ecosystem. As exemplified by several articles in
this special issue, the dynamics of, conditions
of and for, and rules for each competitive front
differ and it is difficult to transfer learning
from one competitive front to another—the
rules may even contradict each other, creating
constant tensions. The rules and principles are
also contingent—they depend on the size and
position of the firm and the size, nature and
maturity of the platform(s) on which the firm
participates. In addition, past technological
choices around platform stack(s) have been path
dependent, with the scope and rate of the firm’s
learning about the nature of interactions and
potential reach and range effects varying and
shaping future competitive moves.
Given the complex and dynamic character
of the emerging competitive landscape, there
is ample scope for insightful practice-oriented
research on platform competition. Most studies
to date have examined platform competition
from the viewpoint of the platform owner and

addressed related scaling and or governance
issues associated with intraplatform (owner/
complementors)33 or interplatform (between
platforms) competition.34 These studies have
mostly focused on conditions that either create
positive externalities35 or examine conditions
for platform ignition and the initial creation of
positive network externalities.36 As we describe
next, the case studies in the special issue report
a far greater diversity of competitive choices that
firms need to make across several competitive
fronts in their business ecosystems.

Review of the Individual
Contributions
We next synthesize the contributions of
the articles included in this special issue. The
pivotal insights culled from the articles around
33 Constantinides, H., Henfridsson, O. and Parker G. “Digital
Infrastructure and Platforms Information Systems Research,” Information Systems Research (29:2), 2018, pp. 381-400.
34 See for example Karhu, K., Gustafsson, R. and Lyytinen, K.
“Exploiting and Defending Open Digital Platforms with Boundary
Resources: Android’s Five Platform Forks,” Information Systems
Research (29:2), 2018, pp. 479-497.
35 Tiwana, A. Evolutionary Competition in Platform Ecosystems.
Information Systems Research (26:2), 2015, pp. 266-281
36 Ondrus, J., Gannamaneni, A., Lyytinen, K. “The Impact of
Openness on the Market Potential of Multi-Sided Platforms: A Case
Study of Mobile Payment Platforms,” Journal of Information Technology, (30:3), pp. 260-275.
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platform competition are summarized in Table
1. We developed the summary by applying the
platform competition framework represented
in Figure 1 as a baseline. The framework
organizes the articles into four groups, where
each group includes the articles that focus on
a specific competitive front. We then analyzed
the articles for a synthesis in terms of how the
competition had been framed for that front in
each group by identifying the germane facets of
competition reported in each article. Accordingly,
the articles in Table 1 are categorized based
on their focus on an identified competition
front, i.e., inter- intra-, per- and pre-platform
competition. For each article, the table then
highlights how competition was synchronized
with other competitive fronts (if there are any
other front labels in the Competition Front
column). For each article, we then report the
nature of the focal platform(s) and the types of
interactions enabled. The next column enlists
the types of strategies (competitive moves) that
form the empirical evidence for the conducted
competitive analysis. Next, we note the primary
digitalization effects pursued by the focal digital
platform. The next column summarizes the key
challenges faced by the firm in orchestrating
moves on the competitive front. Finally, the last
column summarizes the core principles through
which the firm sought to compete in the given
competitive front.
This special issue covers articles focusing
on each competitive front (see Table 1). Two
articles focus on interplatform competition
(with Salesforce, Mobilepay), two focus on perplatform competition (with Telco and Dr. Oetker),
one focuses on intraplatform competition
(Steam), one (Spotify) focuses on both intraand inter-level competition, and two focus on
pre-platform competition (concerning digital
disruption in industries/open commons,). Given
the noted complexity of platform competition,
it is no surprise that, in many cases, these foci
are highly contingent on the specific context,
the nature of the platform and its evolutionary
stage. They are also interrelated. Considerations
of interplatform competition necessarily
include aspects of intraplatform competition
since, to compete as a platform, all participants
(complementors) need to have an equitable stake
in the competition and the platform itself needs
to balance reach and range in offering its value

xiv
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proposition (goods) to the market. Similarly,
intraplatform competition among participants
also includes how participants engage with the
platform owners, which influences interplatform
competition. Per-platform competition involves
the broader ecosystem where the focal platform
competes but also includes intraplatform
competition on other platforms on which
the focal platform participates and could be
competing for market share.
The two cases focusing on interplatform
competition (from the viewpoint of the platform
owner) exhibit different competitive dynamics.
Salesforce37 is a dominant software (product)
platform offering a wide range of complements.
The key question posed is whether and how
Salesforce’s complementor acquisitions helped
bolster its competitive position in relation to
similar competing product platforms (Oracle,
SAP). Mobilepay38 is a transaction platform
for mobile interbank payments (and related
transfers between client accounts). It analyzes
how Mobilepay had to compete across multiple
heterogeneous rivals, including Apple Pay,
credit card companies, other banks’ mobile
payment platforms, to expand its reach (and
related network effects). The article also shows
how within this dynamic, the bank as owner
and orchestrator had to constantly balance the
pursuit for reach with a coordinated effort to
manage its range of services.
Per-platform competition embraces a
holistic ecosystem perspective of competing
both as a platform owner and a participant. The
Telcocorp39 case examines how an established
telecommunications company transformed its
existing relationships and became a platform
owner and an orchestrator of its own and
complementor services. The company fostered
co-creation across it partners as it sought
to launch new types of content and service
“bundles” and related platform services around a
common IoT solution (physical/network layers).
The article narrates the firm’s experimental
search for one or possibly several feasible IoT
37 Staub, N., Haki, K., Aier, S., Winter, R., Magan, A. “Acquisition of Complementors as a Strategy for Evolving Digital Platform
Ecosystems,” MIS Quarterly Executive (21:4), 2021, pp. 237-258.
38 Staykova, K. and Damsgaard, J. op cit., 2021.
39 Marheine, C., Engel, C., Back, A. 2021): “How an Incumbent
Telecoms Operator Became an IoT Ecosystem Orchestrator,” MIS
Quarterly Executive (21:4), 2021, pp. 297-314.
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platform solutions, created by using their IoT
data pipes and sharing the data across platform
participants in specific industry settings. The
second article in this category approaches
the new competitive landscape from the
viewpoint of a traditional firm in an established
manufacturing industry (Dr. Oetker).40 It
illustrates how Dr. Oetker had to constantly
experiment and navigate a complex competitive
landscape to manage many decisions concerning
which platforms to use, whether to create its own
platform and the extent to which it should use
traditional competitive mechanisms.
The Spotify41 case narrates the evolution
of a popular digital content delivery platform
that competes with both device-specific (e.g.,
Apple Music) and generic platforms (e.g.,
Sirius). Given the lack of a single device for the
content, the key focus here is on how to manage
and coordinate platform feature development
(partially through complementors) in a way
that overcomes the challenges of being unable
to leverage device-specific features to compete
while growing the market by engaging with
several device platforms. The company could not
change its focus and needed to compete both as
a platform (interplatform) and as a participant
(interplatform) on other platforms, with each
front reinforcing the other.
Intraplatform competition involves issues
of how participants offering digital services on
a platform can compete effectively. The article
(on data from Steam)42 discusses how large
and small complementors on gaming platforms
can successfully compete. Many platforms have
a few large participants who dominate the
platform market (following the power law and
related 80-20 rule of how revenue is distributed
in the market). The question then is: What
are the specific strategies and tactics that the
complementors should follow to reach that
position? Specifically, the study focuses on the
resource differential between the two types of
complementors that lead to different strategy
playbooks in developing that position.
40 Rövekamp, P., Ollig, P., Buhl, H. U., Keller, R., Christmann, R.,
Remmert, P. and Thamm, T, op. cit., 2022.
41 Skog, D., Sandberg, J. and Wimelius, J. “How Spotify Balanced
Trade-Offs in Pursuing Digital Platform Growth,” MIS Quarterly
Executive (21:4), 2021, pp. 259-274.
42 Hukal P., Kanata I., Ozalp H. “Different Strategy Playbooks for
Digital Platforms Complementors,” 2022, current issue.

The “pre-group” consists of two articles.
They both focus on the precompetitive phase
of interplatform competition by conducting
a general illustrative analysis of conditions
and rules of how firms can compete in
the precompetitive front under specific
circumstances. The first one (on digital platform
disruption)43 analyzes conditions under which
the industry-level effects of digitization are
likely to become so significant that they generate
extensive reach and range effects conducive to
creating competitive, disruptive platforms. The
analysis focuses on industries that currently
operate with few prior platforms. The article
identifies three sets of initial conditions—
information
problems,
decomposability
of services and unmet customer needs—
that favor the creation of platforms in the
industry and make non-platform incumbents
vulnerable to disruption. The second article
in this category (on open commons44) focuses
on technological and IP-related pre-platform
competition across platforms. In particular, it
discusses how the platform owners can build
and evolve their service stacks by relying on
open-source licensing and external innovation
communities. The precompetitive moves
surrounding “commons” allow platforms to
enhance platform offerings by changing the
platform’s reach or range effects, and/or offer
a means to protect the platform from hostile
control focused competitive moves. The article
describes how platform firms need to launch a
staged and disciplined process of engaging in
precompetitive moves that help them navigate,
manage and learn from the open commons
space. The authors illustrate how companies
should configure their service stacks using open
source components, which will then become a
critical element in their platform competition
portfolio in the long run.

Common Themes: Initial
Analysis
We, as senior editors, have been blessed
with unusual luck in being able to compile
such a diversity of cases and types of platform
43 Cennamo C, Diaferia L., Gaur A. and Salviotti, G., op. cit.,
2022.
44 Legenvre, H., Autio, E., Hameri, A.-P. “How to Harness Open
Technologies for Digital Platform Advantage,” 2022, current issue.
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Table 1: Platform Competition Framework and Cases Studies
Case Study/
Data

Competitive
Front(s)

Type of
Platform

Competitive
Strategy

Digitalization
Effect for Value

Interplatform
competition

Mature
Software
Product
with New
Complements

Acquisition

Reach Effects:
Broader offerings to
both complementors
and clients

New IoT Data
Sharing/
Service

Initial
Orchestration
of a Platform
Ecosystem

Salesforce
(1)

Per-platform
competition

Range Effects:
Extend the core
technology and
functionality of the
product

“TelcoCorp”
(2)

Range Effects: Cocreation of value
with flexible partner
relationships/
contracts

Intercplatform
competition

Payment
Service

Offensive and
defensive actions
to compete
on multiple
battlefronts,
including other
platforms related
to other services

Mobilepay
(3)

xvi

Reach Effects:
Grow network
by establishing
interoperability with
bigger partners,
reducing prices,
and building novel
functionalities that
lock in customers.
Range Effects:
Augment value
proposition
through innovative
functionalities,
imitating
competitors, and
collaborating for
capability building

Inter- and
Intraplatform
competition
Spotify (4)

Reach Effects:
Providing a solution
to specific customer
problems from
which ecosystem of
partners can grow.

Content/
Service

How to scale
the platform
across multiple
device platforms
and compete
with related
content services
(platforms)
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Reach Effects: Make
service inexpensive
and available across
multiple devices
Range Effects:
Careful partnering
with device
platforms and allow
outbound interfacing
through APIs

Key Challenges

How to Compete?

•Difficulty in
understanding
overlapping offerings
•Integration across
offerings

•Clarify strategic
direction for acquisitions
•Ensure coherency and
consistency of offerings
and communicate them
clearly
•Develop a flexible
approach to integrate
complements

•Deciding whether
to make or buy
interoperable IT
infrastructure
•Tension between
focus on the supply
side (offerings) vs. the
demand side (growth)
•Extending traditional
buyer-supplier
relationships to IoT
flexible contracts
•How to manage
trade-offs between
custom solutions with
possibilities for scaling

•Shorten time-tomarket with off the shelf
solutions
•Expand ecosystem
beyond existing
customer base
•Strive for individual
custom solutions while
looking for opportunities
to generalize and scale
•Monetize data on the
platform

•Vulnerability to
partners (e.g., for
infrastructure) becoming
rivals
•Speed to develop
capabilities and/or when
to rely on partners that
creates a dependency
•Leverage collaboration
to build up capabilities
to compete with large
non-native disrupters
entering the market

•Leverage existing IT
capabilities to establish
control over each
battlefront, but abandon
the synergies to retain
control over a battlefront
•Prevent users from
multihoming to rival
platforms
•Grow the user network
preemptively by
mirroring competitors’
key features while
denying interoperability
•Identify and prioritize
users who ultimately
decide the winner of the
competitive battle

•Rapid growth
challenges infrastructure
•Complementor
development restricts
growth across platforms
•Over-dependency on
device platforms

•Understand and
facilitate “homing”
preferences of
customers
•Manage growth
through careful control
of platform and device
dependencies
•Reduce dependence on
device platforms through
careful partnerships
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Table 1: Platform Competition Framework and Cases Studies (Continuation)
Case Study/ Competitive
Data
Front(s)
Per-platform
competition as
an owner and
complementor
Dr. Oetker
(5)

Type of Platform
Augmenting
physical product
with additional
content/experience
through platform
orchestration

Intraplatform
Product platform
competition by with gaming
complementors complements

Data from
Steam (6)

Digitalization Effect
for Value

Crossplatform
orchestration
strategy

Reach effects: Consider
the supply side (grow
core offerings) and the
demand side (grow
network)
Range effects:
Managing customer
needs (touchpoints)
and deciding where to
collaborate vs. compete
across own and other
platforms

How to
differentiate
between
long tail of
complements
where tactics
depend on
resources/
visibility

Reach effects: By
enhancing content
discoverability to
leverage platform’s
network effects
Range effects: By
selective modularization
(investing in specific
technical features
provided on platform)
and asset fortification
(developing
unique resources),
complementors
differentiate offerings

Key Challenges

How to Compete?

•Developing an
overarching goal for
per-platform strategy
instead of piece-meal
initiatives
•Recognition of the
value of collaboration
in lieu of inclination
toward platform
ownership

•Recognize stages
of platform and
capability growth
and develop a digital
platform strategy for
each phase
•Articulate and
implement goals
and structures
for per-platform
orchestration early in
the process.

•Challenge for minor
complementors to
work around resource
constraints
•Major
complementors must
balance exclusivity
on a platform due to
unique resources with
multihoming on other
platforms

•Minor
complementors
need grass-roots
promotion and niche
tactics with respect
to features and
resources to compete
•Major
complementors need
to leverage asset
fortification with
content discovery
and selective
modularization

Industrylevel early
pre-platform
competition

Product/service
augmented
with multisided
interactions

Pooling
information
offerings
across
demand and
supply-side
interactions

Reach effects:
Multisided platforms
will pool services and
expand markets

•Identifying and
addressing information
asymmetry, complexity
and fragmentation
•Modularizing
Range effects: Mitigating offerings and providing
information asymmetry, mechanisms for
disaggregating services
flexible recombination
into interconnected
•Addressing latent
modules, and exploiting heterogenous
unaddressed customer
customer needs
needs/preferences with within the confines of
new services
modularization

•Incumbents need
to diagnose their
disruption list
based on the level
of information
problems, product
modularity and
unaddressed needs
in their existing and
potential markets

Pre-platform
competition

Variety
(architectural/
technological
choices)

Sponsor,
support,
safeguard
and siphon
strategies to
improve and
protect value

Reach effects: Attract
best developers through
opening governance and
norms of reciprocity,
amplifying the commons
resource

•Identify resources
and projects that are
strategic and should
be protected vs.
those that can benefit
from participation
•Determine
positioning level in
commons ecosystem
game as an adopter
or contributor or at
steering, mobilizing
or projecting levels

Digital
platform
disruption
(7)

Open
Source
Platforms
(8)

Competitive
Strategy

Range effects: Mobilize
resources toward
resolving bottlenecks
and expanding current
and future offerings

•Participants will get
high rents through
proprietary resource
control
•Infrastructural
bottlenecks constrain
the ability of
ecosystem participants
to increase the range
and scale of their
offerings
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competition into a single special issue. We were
also pleasantly surprised by the quality of the
papers. At the same time, we found it challenging
to write this review because of the complexity,
dynamism and novel aspects that each
article reveals about contemporary platform
competition. The reader can gain a preliminary
understanding of each article, its content and
contribution by just reading our introductory
note on the special issue (MISQE Volume 20,
Issue 4) and by glancing through Table 1. The
rich details of each case will be left to each
reader to examine through a thorough reading of
each article. Below, we instead identify common
themes, issues and logic that cut across all or
some of the articles and the competitive fronts
they cover.
Overall, the richness of the dynamics in
firms’ competitive landscapes that the included
articles narrate demonstrates the heightened
complexity brought by platform competition
and the consequent challenges it poses for the
participating firms. The articles vividly illustrate
that their new competitive landscapes are never
at a standstill and pose constant challenges for
the firm to orchestrate effective and prompt
responses. Therefore, platform competition
calls for configurational flexibility to address
the constant, multiple and heterogeneous
changes in firms’ business ecosystems. However,
formulating generic models and competitive
rules characteristic of competition models
and explanations during the era of industrial
organization can be misleading and even
dangerous. We need extensive analyses of larger
sets of competition cases and situations before
we can fully understand how each competitive
front behaves and what its competitive logic
is. We also lack research into how the four
competitive fronts interact and evolve and how
they are balanced during competition by firms.
None of the articles truly addressed the issue of
cross-balancing competitive fronts.
Pivotal dimensions that shape the contours
of the emerging arena of platform competition
are, however, already clearly visible in the eight
articles. Some of them align with past seminal
analyses of the nature of platform competition.45
45 See, e.g., Constantinides, H., Henfridsson, O. and Parker G.,
op. cit., 2018. or Parker, G. G., Van Alstyne, M. W. and Choudary, S.
P., op. cit., 2016.
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Several articles recognize the need to control
heterogeneous ecosystem dependencies produced
through platform creation and participation
(e.g., Salesforce, TelcoCorp) and the need to
understand the role of resource dependencies
originating from the deployment of unique
service stacks (e.g., Steam, Spotify, Open Source).
These dependencies determine and/or enable
participant interactions, their experiences
and value extraction. Some articles observe
common challenges in handling reach and/
or range effects and the associated trade-offs
(e.g., TelcoCorp). The articles also recognize
challenges in moving from traditional pipeline
models to platforms where relationships and
governance of value needs to be redefined (e.g.,
Dr. Oetker, TelcoCorp). Also, the need to rapidly
pivot when considering fast-moving competition.
This requires the need to “build” new capabilities
expediently (e.g., Mobilepay). Finally, co-creating
value with complementors both internally
and externally on other platforms in several
competitive spaces requires careful resource and
rule orchestration. Complementors themselves
need to evaluate their dependencies on the
platform and opportunities for multihoming while
the platform owner seeks to maintain exclusivity
(e.g., Salesforce, Steam) or not (e.g., Spotify).
As part of the analysis, we have also
synthesized several critical factors and
competitive strategy trade-offs that were
foregrounded for each competitive front (Table
2). This synthesis of common factors and
strategies is organized along the four competitive
fronts of Figure 1. For each front, we synthesized
the critical factors that were attended to in
each article within this competitive front and
the consequent competitive strategy trade-offs
that had to be addressed. On the intraplatform
competition front, the critical factor faced
by owners and complementors alike was
the challenge of how to integrate all services
into a uniform experience on the platform
while still being able to differentiate between
varying offerings on the same platform. For
complementors, the challenge was how to
integrate their offerings on each platform in
ways that do not exclude multihoming and
innovation beyond the possibilities on the given
platform. For owners, the challenge was how to
maintain the uniformity of the experience while
still enabling innovation by complementors. This
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Table 2: Key Trade-Offs in Each Competitive Front
Competitive
Front

Critical Factor(s)

Competitive Strategy Trade-Offs

Illustrations

Integration with
platform visibility/
differentiation

Decide how to integrate (dependency) on
a platform that can limit multihoming

Primary: (6)
Secondary: (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(7)(8)

Carefully allocate resources for promotion
and innovation

e.g., (6) On the Steam gaming
platform, large and small
complementors need to compete
differently based on the resources
needed for visibility and integration
with the platform

Integration of
complementors

Breadth of complementors increases value Primary: (1)(3)(4)
proposition but also distort offerings
Secondary: (6)(7)(8)

Participation on
other platforms

Deep vertical relationships improve value
for customers on each platform but limit
expansion opportunities on others

e.g., (1) Salesforce is a digital
product platform with the challenge
of integrating complements into
a unified product; (4) Spotify is a
content distributor platform that
configures its offerings for growth in
users on different devices

Decide where to participate and what to
own in a given ecosystem and determine
where the main opportunities and threats
across the platforms are

Primary: (2)(5)
Secondary: (1)(3)(6)(7)(8)

Intraplatform
front

Interplatform
front

Flexible relationships
and strategies
Modularized offerings render services
accessible on other platforms but make it
more difficult to manage related growth
Coherent strategy

Per-platform
competitive
front

Vulnerability
to platform
competition
Pre-platform
competitive
front

What are the information problems, level
of modularization (and reconfiguration)
and unmet customer needs that will
provide opportunities for platform
Leverage of common creation
resource
When and how to participate in open
source development vs. purchased,
customized or indigenous development in
your service stack

calls for careful decisions on how to allocate
resources, what to open and what to close and
where to innovate.
For
complementors,
intraplatform
competition coincides with the management
of per-platform competition, which, in turn,
affects the overall interplatform competition.
The challenge for owners is integrating
complementors to ensure uniformity while also
providing incentives for platform participation.
For complementors, the main concern is how
to balance the trade-offs associated with
participating on other platforms. In both

e.g., (5) Dr. Oetker is a traditional
firm that adds value through
information services offered across
platforms; (2) Telcocorp configures
its platform ecosystem to create
complementarities and related new
value-added services for different
stakeholders
Primary: (7)(8)
e.g., new entrants like Google and
Android opted for platform commons
strategy, in contrast to former
competitors like Nokia

situations, the issue is how to devise flexible
relationships and strategies that allow for the
effective treatment of factors and help balance
the trade-offs between a sufficient breadth of
complementors and the potentially distorting
effect of having too much variety (range effects).
Both platform and complementor firms need to
consider how to harvest the benefits of deeper
vertical relationships while avoiding limiting
opportunities for expansion in other settings
(reach/range effects). To this end, firms need
to build capabilities to modularize their service
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offerings in ways that help balance trade-offs at
the service stack level.
At the per-platform level of competition, the
critical factor is how to maintain a coherent
strategy across multiple competitive fronts while
investing in the service stack. The trade-offs cover
decisions regarding full platform ownership
(or which platform components to own) and
participating on a select set of platforms while
avoiding fragmenting offerings and making
business ecosystem orchestration too complex.
At the level of pre-platform competition, the
critical factor is how to manage dependencies
and essential resources in the service stack. This
calls for a diligent analysis of what to own, how
to manage dependencies between components
and services, which platform components to own
or not own, and how to avoid fragmentation by
maintaining coherence in technology choices.
Also, all companies need to be prepared for being
a disrupter or being potentially disrupted by new
platform competition.

Competitive Strategy:
Resolving Tensions
The richness of the cases and the specific
character of the competitive situations covered
suggest that there are few “general” rules on
how firms can effectively engage across all
competitive fronts. The idiosyncrasy of each
front also makes it challenging to identify a
common set of critical factors and an associated
boilerplate logic. However, in assessing the
cases, it became apparent that any competitive
strategy will need to attend to and resolve several
competitive “tensions” that both platform owners
and participants face. Below, we identify 11
tensions that were gleaned from the articles for
further analysis and resolution in terms of each
competitive situation encountered on platforms.
These tensions represent fertile opportunities for
future practice-oriented research.
1. Tension: clarity vs. fragmentation of
offerings
If you are a platform offering a digital service
and you need to leverage complementors, then it is
essential to integrate the complementors effectively
into a clear offering that manages competition
between core and periphery products.
2. Tension: reach vs. coherence of offerings
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If you are a platform participating on multiple
platforms, then it is important to examine the
reach to different customer segments against the
coherence (uniformity) of the offering.
3. Tension: openness vs. proprietary nature
of platform/resources
If you are a platform owner, how “open” do you
want the platform to be, where openness stimulates
participation at the cost of distinctiveness or
proprietary relationships or control of resources.
4. Tension: broad vs. tailored offerings
If you deeply engage (as a platform or a
complementor) with customers on their problem,
then it is critical to examine whether and how it
might limit opportunities for broader solutions for
a larger customer base
5. Tension: engagement with platform vs.
multihoming
If you are a complementor offering digital
services, you need to decide how deeply to
integrate with the platform (or establish exclusivity
arrangements) at the cost of multihoming and
expanding the reach of your offering.
6. Tension: loose vs. tight coupling of
resources
If you are a platform, coupling between digital
resources on the platform is important—where
looser coupling (more interface flexibility) offers
opportunities to pivot while tighter coupling
promotes efficient processes.
7. Tension: configuration of capabilities vs.
expediency to compete
If you are a platform facing a rapidly changing
competitive environment with different target
markets, it is important to prioritize the markets
and expediently build/configure the requisite
capabilities to compete.
8. Tension: status quo vs. disruption
If you are a traditional incumbent, it is
important to determine whether your competitive
environment has information problems, your
offering can be modularized, and your customers
have unmet needs, to see whether you are
vulnerable to platform-driven disruption.
9. Tension: supply side vs. demand side
If you are a platform then it is important to
provide the right incentive structure to expand
your customer value proposition (supply side)
while correspondingly engaging with and
expanding the customer base through a wider
range of services (demand side).
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10. Tension: reach vs. identity
If you are a platform, it is useful to consider how
you can modularize or configure your offerings to
participate in other platforms without losing your
identity.
11. Tension: expediency vs. dependency
If you are building a platform, it is important
to consider whether off-the-shelf solutions can
accelerate deployment and competitiveness
or whether these solutions create unhealthy
dependencies.
It is important to note that these 11 tensions
need to be read as “sensitizing” probes. By
interrogating the situation through the lens
of each tension, one can orient, analyze and
understand specific competitive situations
better within each competitive front. During
such probes, each tension can be contextualized
and assessed in terms of competitive trade-offs
between costs and benefits and can then inform
the formulation of the competitive strategy.
The actual manifestation of each tension and
its resolution is likely to play out in manifold
ways. Hence, any sensible logic for platform
competition calls for contextual sensitivity,
flexibility and adaptation. It demands conceptual
means and managerial practices to simplify the
complexity regarding key dimensions that matter
for the decision situation. Learning by doing,
building capacities to learn from experience and
learning fast are critical dynamic capabilities that
characterize platform competition.

Concluding Comments
This special issue is, to our knowledge, the first
that focuses directly on platform competition.
Through a rich and diverse set of practiceoriented research articles, it clearly reveals
the excess complexity of competing with or on
platforms. We suspect that the nascent domain
of platform competition will likely push us to
rework most of our canons of strategy and
competition over the next several years and call
for a careful reanalysis of what a fully digital
strategy for a firm in a given setting means, in
contrast to older notions of business strategy
that relied on concepts and foundations of
industrial organization, pipes and fixed resources.
The primary question driving this work is:
How can firms effectively compete in emerging
and fluctuating multidimensional platformed

landscapes? Secondary questions revolve
around the tensions identified in this paper
and their resolution. In this regard, platform
competition forms a burgeoning, highly complex,
largely untried space for research and practice.
At the same time, addressing such questions
will have life and death implications for many
organizations.
Prior concepts for analyzing competition still
apply. But they need to be completely rethought
for the platform environment. For instance,
principles of scale and scope economies apply but
their meaning needs to be articulated anew, as the
economic foundations, costs and risks of digitally
mediated platform competition are essentially
different. Notions of valuable, rare, inimitable and
nonsubstitutable (VRIN) resource pools and their
configurations still apply but the sources of value,
the factors determining rarity, and the elements
that are inimitable and non-substitutable are
radically different. Moreover, the staying power
of each of the elements in the new competitive
landscape is short and fleeting since, in a digital
context, most of them are software and data
based. Notions of dynamic capabilities apply, but
we currently have little understanding of what
such capabilities might be for each competitive
front and especially for their flexible firm-level
coordination.
Finally, firms continue to face high levels of
technological uncertainty and disruption. This
change parallels what mobile computing, 4G
networks and the cloud did for the creation of
firms like AirBnB and Uber, which followed on
firms like Amazon, Apple and Google, which
were created during the period of e-commerce
and the diffusion of the internet service stack.
In the coming decade, we will see changes that
could fundamentally shape how the physical
layer (e.g., sensors/robotics), the network layer
(5G), and the content and service layers using
so-called Web 3.0 technologies (new cloud-based
data services, AI, block-chain) will be configured.
New unexpected forms and arrangements of
platform competition are likely to emerge, such
as continuous AI-based service configurations,
new forms of algorithmic control that enable
multimodal participant interactions, or new
distributed forms of platform governance. What
we have seen thus far is likely the tip of the
iceberg regarding forms of platform competition.
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Therefore, continuing to accumulate important
in-depth cases that add to our understanding
of types of platforms, the competitive fronts
and their associated tensions, trade-offs and
challenges is critically important if we are
to develop robust prescriptions for platform
competition.
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